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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account 
agents’ preferences for understanding how the process works. We assume that the agents 
have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it 
does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the central planner. 
We show that the presence of such preferences functions effectively in eliminating 
unwanted equilibria from the practical perspective, even if the degree of the preference for 
honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail-free and involve only small fines. 
 
Keywords: Intrinsic Preferences for Honesty, Detail-free Mechanisms, Full 
Implementation, Small Fines, Permissive Result 




  This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account 
agents’ preferences for understanding not just the consequence but also how the process 
works. We investigate Bayesian environments wherein a central planner is unaware of the 
desired alternative to be chosen, even if there exist multiple agents and they do receive their 
private signal concerning this alternative. The central planner delegates the alternative   3
choice to these agents by designing a mechanism, according to which each agent makes 
announcements about their private signals. Full implementation requires that the values of 
the social choice function, i.e., the desired alternatives, are induced by the unique Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium. 
The previous works have constructed complicated mechanisms, which are tailored to 
the finer detail of specifications. This complexity makes it difficult to put the 
implementation theory into practice.
1 For instance, let us consider the mechanisms provided 
by Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1992b, 1994), in which the agents are required to make 
multiple announcements about their private signals at the same time. The central planner 
regards their first announcements as a reference and fines a small monetary amount to any 
agent who is the first to deviate from this reference. As long as the agents are honest during 
their first announcements, this device of small fines functions to incentivize the agents to 
keep their all other announcements honest. Incentivizing the agents to keep their first 
announcements honest at the outset might be a more problematic issue. In order to solve 
this issue, Abreu and Matsushima incorporated an additional incentive scheme into the 
device of small fines, which is, however, not detail-free, i.e., it depends heavily on the finer 
detail of specifications such as the probability function and the utility functions. The failure 
to make the mechanisms detail-free is the main drawback of the implementation theory 
from the practical perspective.
2 
                                                 
1 See survey articles such as Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 10), 
and Maskin and Sjöström (2002). 
2 Another practical problem concerns whether actual agents play iteratively undominated strategies. In 
experimental economics, it is a well known idea that even if subjects never enforce many iterations of 
removal at once, they may learn to achieve a sufficiently large number of iterations in the long run. See   4
  The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of implementing social 
choice functions without harming the detail-free concept of mechanism design. The crucial 
assumption is that each of these agents has an intrinsic preference for honesty in the sense 
that she/he dislikes the idea of telling white lies that do not influence her welfare but 
instead go against the intention of the central planner. With the intrinsic preference for 
honesty in this sense, we do not need to incorporate any additional incentive scheme with 
the device of small fines. All we have to do is just to keep the agents’ first few 
announcements irrelevant to the alternative decision. Hence, by using only detail-free 
mechanisms, we can fully and exactly implement any incentive compatible social choice 
function in iterative dominance. Apart from incentive compatibility, we do not require any 
condition on social choice functions. These features are in contrast with the previous works 
in the implementation literature, where agents’ intrinsic preferences for honesty were not 
generally taken into account.
3 
Several experimental economics researches such as Gneezy (2005) emphasized that 
the role of intrinsic preferences in this manner is non-negligible in economic decisions. 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), on other hand, raised the alarm that agents’ intrinsic 
preferences to influence their decisions are heavily dependent on contexts and framings. 
For instance, agents’ intrinsic costs of lying may not be significant as long as they expect 
that the central planner believes that they lie. Moreover, since each agent makes so many 
                                                                                                                                                     
Camerer (2003), for instance. There is a difficulty in applying this idea to our situation in that each agent’s 
own experiences are severely limited, and therefore, she/he has to utilize the other agents’ experiences. 
Huck, Jehiel, and Rutter (2006) obtained experimental results stating that learning is affected by the 
framing of feedback information about the other agents’ experiences. How to fix this framing in the first 
place is an interesting question but is beyond the purpose of this paper.   5
announcements at once, it is inevitable that her/his intrinsic cost of lying for each single 
announcement is severely limited. 
Despite the fragility of the intrinsic preferences in this manner, the result of this paper 
should be regarded as being quite permissive. Overcoming this fragility only requires that 
the proportion of announcements that are irrelevant to the alternative decision be sufficient. 
This would show that even if each agent’s intrinsic cost of lying for all of her/his 
announcements is close to zero, any incentive compatible social choice function is fully and 
exactly implementable in iterative dominance.
4 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3 specifies 
detail-free mechanisms. Section 4 shows the main theorem. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Let  A denote a finite set of alternatives; ∆, the set of lotteries over the alternatives; 
and  {1,..., } Nn = , a finite set of agents, where  2 n ≥ . Further, let  i Ω  denote a finite set of 




i , the set of private signal 
profiles; and  :[ 0 , 1 ] p Ω→ , a probability function over Ω, according to which the private 
                                                                                                                                                     
3 There are exceptions such as Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) and Eliaz (2002). 
4 We eliminate only strictly dominated messages by using the same method used in the studies for virtual 
implementation by Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1992b). Abreu and Matsushima (1994) investigated 
exact implementation, just like this paper does; however, unlike this paper, they used iteratively weakly 
undominated strategies where only weakly dominated strategies were eliminated.   6
signal profile  () iiN ω ω ∈ =∈ Ω  is drawn randomly. A social choice function  A f → Ω : i s  
defined as a mapping from private signal profiles to alternatives. 
The central planner wants to achieve the desirable alternative  () f A ω ∈  that depends 
on the private signal profile ω ∈Ω, which is not known to her/him. She/he delegates the 





ii mM ∈ ,  i M   is a finite set of messages for each agent i ,  ∆ → M x:,  N i i t t ∈ = ) ( , and 
: i tM R → . When the agents announce a message profile  M m m N i i ∈ = ∈ ) ( , the central 
planner chooses any alternative aA ∈  with the probability  () [ ] x ma  and makes a monetary 
transfer  () i tm to each  agent i   with certainty. We focus on mechanisms, in which each 
agent makes multiple announcements about her/his private signal; a positive integer K  
exists such that for every  N i∈ , 
K
i i M Ω =  and  K i i i M M M , 1 , × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × = , 
where  ,1 ()
K
ii k k i mm M = =∈ ,  , ik i M =Ω , and  ,, ik ik mM ∈  for  all  {1,..., } kK ∈ . For every 
{1,..., } kK ∈ , we term  ,, ik ik mM ∈  as the kt h −  announcement of agent i. 
We define a utility function for each agent  N i∈  by  : i uARM R × ×× Ω →, where 
there exist functions  R A vi → Ω × :  and  :[0,1] ii cR ×Ω→  such that 
   (0, ) 0 ii c ω = , 
(, ) ii cr ω  is continuous and increasing with respect to  [0,1] r∈ , 
and   7
, #{ {1,..., }| }
(,, , ) (, ) ( , )
ik i
ii i i i i
kK m





=+ − . 
Note that 










 implies  agent  ' is  intrinsic cost of lying when 
she/he receives the private signal  ii ω ∈Ω   and announces the message  ii mM ∈ . This 
intrinsic cost depends on the proportion of her/his dishonest announcements, 
, #{ {1,..., }| } ik i kK m
K
ω ∈≠
. This cost does not depend on the absolute number of dishonest 
announcements. Hence, the intrinsic cost of lying for each single announcement is severely 
limited whenever the number of announcements that each agent is required to make is very 
large. Further, note that  (, ) i va ω  implies the utility of agent i for her/his material interest. 
Moreover, we assume quasi-linearity and risk-neutrality in terms of monetary transfers. 
We shall confine our attention to social choice functions f  that  satisfy  incentive 
compatibility in terms of the agents’ material interests in that for every  N i∈ ,  i i Ω ∈ ω , and 
} /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
(1)     [(() ,) | ] [((, ) ,) | ] ii i i i i Ev f Ev f ω ωω ω ω ωω − ′ ≥ , 
where  ] | [ i E ω ⋅  is the expectation operator given  i ω . Incentive compatibility implies that 
truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the direct mechanism irrespective of whether 
or not the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty. 
Let  N i i u u ∈ = ) (   denote a utility function profile. A combination (,) Gu  defines  a 
Bayesian game. A strategy for each agent  N i∈  is defined as a function  i i i M s → Ω : . We 
denote  ,1 ()
K
ii k k ss = =  and  ,1 ()( () )
K
ii i ki k ss ωω = = , where  , : ik i i s Ω →Ω , and  , () ik i i s ω ∈Ω    8
denotes the kt h −  announcement of agent i. Let  i S  denote the set of strategies for agent i. 




i S S ,  N i i i s s ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω ω , and 
} /{ )) ( ( ) ( i N j j j i i s s ∈ − − = ω ω . 
The solution concept used in this paper is iterative dominance, which is defined as 
follows. Let  i i S S =





) 0 ( ) 0 ( . Recursively, for every  1,2,... h = , let 
() h
i S  denote 
the set of strategies 
(1 ) h
ii sS
− ∈   for each agent i  that  are  undominated with respect to 














−− ∈ , 
[ ( ( , ( )), ( , ( )),( , ( )), )| ] i i iii i ii i ii i E ux ms tms ms ω ωω ω ω −− −− −−  
[ ( ( ( )), ( ( )), ( ), )| ] ii i Eu xs t s s ω ωω ω ω > , 
where we denote  (,,,) (,,,)() ii i i
aA
ur m u a r m a α ωω α
∈
















= ∩ . A strategy profile  S s∈  is said to be iteratively undominated in (,) Gu 
if 
) (∞ ∈S s . We define the honest strategy 
*
ii sS ∈  for agent i by 
*
, () ik i i s ω ω =  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  and all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
The honest strategy profile 
** () ii N ss S ∈ =∈  induces the value of the social choice function 
() f ω  for every ω ∈Ω with no monetary transfers; in other words, for every ω ∈Ω, 
   
* ( ( ))[ ( )] 1 xs f ωω =  and 
* (() )0 i tsω =  for all iN ∈ . 
   9
3. Mechanism Design 
 
We fix a positive real number  0 ε >  such that 
(2)     (1, ) ii c ε ω <  for all iN ∈ , 
which implies that ε  is selected less than the intrinsic disutility for each agent when she/he 
lies during all her/his announcements. Note that there exists such an ε , because  (, ) ii i crω  is 
continuous and increasing with respect to  [0,1] i r ∈ , and  (0, ) 0 ii c ω = . Moreover, we fix two 
positive integers K  and  ˆ K  such that  ˆ K K > , 
(3)      
ˆ












(4)    
2 (,,, )
ˆ () m a x( , ) ( , ) ii
aa i A N
KK v a v a
ω
ε ωω
′ ∈× Ω ×
′ −> − . 
From inequality (2) and the continuity and increase of  i c , note that there exist such a K  




 is sufficiently close to unity to satisfy inequality (3), 
and 
ˆ K K −  is sufficiently large to satisfy inequality (4). 
 Based  on  ˆ (, , ) K K ε   defined above, we specify the mechanism, denoted by 
ˆ (, , ) ( ,,) GK K M g t ε =  as follows; for every  M m∈ ,   10
, ˆ #{ { 1,..., }| (( ) ) }
() [ ] ˆ






 for all  A a∈ , 
for every  N i∈ , 
() i tm ε = −  if  there  exist  {2,..., } kK ∈  such that  ,, 1 ik i mm ≠  and 
,, 1 () () j hj N j j N mm ∈ ∈ =  for all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h , 
and 
() 0 i tm=    if there exists no such k . 
The central planner requires each agent to announce K  number of times the type of private 
signal that was observed. She/he randomly selects one announcement profile 
,, () j kj N j k iN mM ∈ ∈ ∈×  from  the  last  ˆ K K −   profiles and chooses the alternative 
, (( ) ) jk j N f mA ∈ ∈ , where  ˆ { 1,..., } kK K ∈+ . She/he imposes a fine of  0 ε >  if and only if the 
agent is the first to deviate from her own first announcement. 
  Note that the early  ˆ K   announcement profiles, i.e.,  , () j kj N m ∈  for  ˆ {1,..., } kK ∈ , are 
irrelevant to the alternative decision  () x m .
5 The  mechanism  ˆ (, , ) GK K ε  involves  only 
small fines given by  0 ε > . 
  Note that the mechanism  ˆ (, , ) GK K ε  is detail-free in the following sense. Let us select 
0 ε >   as close to zero, a positive real number  (0,1) λ∈   as being close to unity, and a 
positive real number  0 Q >  such that it is sufficiently large. Moreover, let us select K  and 
                                                 
5 Note that these profiles are relevant to the monetary transfers (( ) ) ii N tm ∈ .   11
ˆ K  to be sufficiently large, such that 
ˆ K
K
 is greater than λ  and  ˆ () K K ε −  is greater than Q. 
Note that inequalities (3) and (4) hold whenever 
(, ) ( , ) ii i i cr cr λ ωω ε +− ≥  for all  [0,1 ] r λ ∈ − , 
and 
2 (,,, )
max ( , ) ( , ) ii




′ ∈× Ω ×
′ − ≤ , 
which are very weak restrictions because ε  is selected such that it is close to zero and Q is 
selected such that it is sufficiently large. Hence, we can say that  ˆ (, , ) GK K ε  does  not 




4. Main Theorem 
 
The following theorem shows that with incentive compatibility, truth-telling is the 
unique iteratively undominated strategy profile in  ˆ (( ,,) ,) GK K u ε , which implies that any 
incentive compatible social choice function is fully implementable in iterative dominance. 
In contrast to the previous works, we do not need any conditions, such as Bayesian 
monotonicity (Jackson (1991)), no consistent deception (Matsushima (1993)), and 
measurability (Abreu and Matsushima (1992b)), in addition to incentive compatibility. 
                                                 
6  The  construction  of  ˆ (, , ) GK K ε   depends on the social choice function f . Needless to say, 
ˆ (, , ) GK K ε  functions rely crucially on the incentive compatibility of the social choice function.   12
Inequality (3) guarantees that each agent is willing to keep her/his early  ˆ K  
announcements honest because her/his intrinsic cost of lying for all of these announcements 
is greater than the small monetary fine ε . Given that the early  ˆ K  announcements  are 
honest, inequality (4), along with incentive compatibility, guarantees that the device of 
small fines functions in incentivizing each agent to keep her/his latter  ˆ K K −  
announcements honest in the same manner as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1992b, 
1994). 
 
The Theorem: The honest strategy profile 
* s S ∈  is uniquely iteratively undominated in 
ˆ (( ,,) ,) GK K u ε . 
 
Proof: Fix  S s∈  and  N i∈  arbitrarily. Further, fix  Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily. Suppose that 
,, 1 () () j kj j k j ss ω ω − ≠  for some  j i ≠  and some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ . 
Then, agent i is never fined at the time of announcing  , ik i m ω =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . Next, 
suppose that 
) ( ) ( 1 , , j k j j k j s s ω ω − =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈  and all  j i ≠ . 
If  , () ik i i s ω ω ≠  for  all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ , then, by announcing  , ik i m ω =  for  all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈  
instead, agent i can save the disutility for lying 



















− ,   13
which is greater than ε  due to (3). If  ) ( ) ( 1 , , i k i i k i s s ω ω − ≠  for some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ , then agent 
i is fined an amount ε . Since the early K ˆ  announcements of agent i do not influence the 
alternative decision, it follows that agent i is willing to replace the early K ˆ  announcements 
K
k i k i s
ˆ
1 , )) ( ( = ω  with 
ˆ *
,1 (( ) )
K
ik i k s ω = . 
 Fix  } ,..., 1 ˆ { K K k + ∈  arbitrarily. Suppose that 
*
,, j kj k s s =  for all  N j∈  and all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k k . 
Further, fix  i i Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily. Suppose that 
, () ii ik s ω ω ≠ . 
Let  i i M m ∈   denote the message for agent i  such  that  , ik i m ω =  for  all  } ,..., 1 { k k ∈  and 
,, () ik ik i ms ω =  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k k + ∈ . 
First, suppose that 
, () j j jk s ω ω ≠  for some  j i ≠ . 
Then,  (( ) ) i ts ω ε =−  and  (,( ) )0 iii i tms ω −−= , which along with (4) imply that agent i 
prefers  i m  to  ) ( i i s ω . Next, suppose that 
, () j j jk s ω ω =  for all  j i ≠ . 
Then,  (( ) ) i ts ω ε =−  and  (,( ) ) iii i tms ω ε −−≥− , which, along with the intrinsic preferences 
for honesty and incentive compatibility given by inequality (1), imply that agent i strictly 
prefers  i m  to  ) ( i i s ω . Hence, we have proved that 
* s  is the unique iteratively undominated 
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